People v Estrada

People of the Philippines v Estrada

GR Nos. 164368-69, 2 Apr. 2009

Brion, J:

FACTS:

                On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against Estrada.  The amended information alleged that on 4 Feb. 2000, President Joseph Estrada represented himself as Jose Velarde in several transactions in order to conceal his ill-gotten weath.  Another case of perjury was Estrada was filed.

Evidence of the Prosecution:

• On 4 Feb. 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account with Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB) and signed as Jose Velarde in the account opening documents as witnessed by Clarissa Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato.
• PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa Barcelan declared that a certain Baby [Lucena] Ortaliza (employed in the Office of the Pres during said transactions were made)  deposited several checks under the account name Jose Velarde on the various dates;

Defense of Estrada:

• Only 2 out of the 35 witnesses presented evidence against Estrada;
• The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11 October 2001;
• There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed without following proper procedures;
• The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

Opposition of the Prosecution:

• Estrada is being prosecuted for violation of CA No. 142 and not BSP Circular No 302;
• Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended, requires publication of the alias and the habitual use thereof, the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in this regard to convict Estrada for illegal use of alias;
• Illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder.

Sandiganbayan (12 July 2004):

• The only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating to what is described in the testimonies and documents on the opening of question Trust Account.  The Sandiganbayan reasoned that the use of disjunctive with regards to the date in the information proved that time is not a material ingredient of the offense and used to prevent it from being interpreted in any other way;
• Sandiganbayan, in citing Ursua v CA, ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the context of CA 142, as amended by RA 6085, only if use of the alias is public and habitual;
• The phrase “Estrada did represent himself as Jose Velarde in several transactions, standing alone” violates Estradas right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and vague.  Thus, Estradas representations before persons other than those mentioned in the Information are immaterial;
• The application of the libel law definition is onerous for CA 142, as a penal statute, should be construed  strictly against the State, and favorably for the accused.   Estrada’s use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405.  On account of the absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant intended to be known as Jose Velarde in addition to his real name;
• Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars of the bank account (such as the name he used to open it);
• The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160.  The use of an alias within the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case.  It held that the use by Estrada of his alias Jose Velarde was not public, and that it was allowable under banking rules.

HELD:

                No.  The Court defined alias, using the case of Ursua, as a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. Hence, it ruled that, in order to violate CA 142, there must be a sign or indication that the user intends to be know by the alias in addition to his real name, and there must be habituality.  The repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use.

                  The Court also ruled that the fact that Estrada was at the time the President and was required to his true name is immaterial for CA 142 applies to all and not just to a man on the street or to the President.  The law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment.

                The court found no merit on the argument of the People that the Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information to Estrada's use of the alias Jose Velarde on February 4, 2000, considering that there were other transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent thereto.

The date of the commission of the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense.

Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said on or about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto would effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two phrases and the THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples present interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead of OR to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the Information.

The issues of publicity, and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405, and R.A. No. 9160

The rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. The use of the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally known, in other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.

The enactment of R.A. No. 9160 clearly manifests that prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.