Miranda v Sandiganbayan
GR No. 154098, 27 June 2005
Puno, J:
FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions for insisting to perform the functions of a mayor despite the preventive suspension order by the Ombudsman.
Mayor Miranda asserted that reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to reassume the position. Notably, Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police. He also contends that under Sec. 63 (b) of the LGC, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days.
On 28 Nov 2001, the prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to suspend Miranda based on Sec. 13 of RA 3019. Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that the offense of usurpation of authority or official functions under Art. 177 of RPC is not embraced by the former provision which only contemplates offenses which involve fraud upon public funds or property.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. The phrase any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is clear and categorical. To limit the use of government as an adjective that qualifies funds is baseless. The word public precedes funds and distinguishes the same from private funds. To qualify further public funds as government funds, as petitioner claims is the laws intent, is plainly superfluous. We are bound by the rule that a statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019, commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials.
It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase fraud upon government means any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government. It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is covered by the preceding phrase any offense involving . . . public funds or property. It ought to follow that fraud upon government was committed when the petitioner allegedly assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.
The court is not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no longer under preventive suspension. Petitioner’s pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioner’s excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.
