11 Apr
11Apr

LAYOLA v GABO

AM No. RTJ-00-1524, 26 Jan 2000

Purisima, J.:

FACTS:

        On 4 June 1996, Lucia Layola filed a complaint charging SPO2 Leopoldo German and PO2 Tomasito Gagui of Santa Maria, Bulacan with homicide for the death Layola’s son.  The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Basilio Gabo.

        On March 1997, petition to take custody of German was filed by Chief of Police base on PD 971, PD 1184 and EO 106 and that the offense imputed is the death of Pablo Layola who was then inside jail.  Such petition was granted by Gabo on 7 Apr 1997.  Motion for reconsideration was denied by Gabo.

Gabo’s justification:

The order was issued according to the comment of the Asst. Prov Prosecutor to whose office the prosecution of the case was indorsed by the Deputy Ombudsman for the military.  The accused indictment was based on circumstantial evidence, hence not so strong as to deprive the accused of his right to bail;

The motion for reconsideration did not raise strong arguments on why the order should be modified;

The disputed order is not the subject of a petition for certiorari in the CA initiated by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the military.

Elements of unjust interlocutory

  1. The offender is a judge;
  2. He performs any of the following acts;
    1. Knowingly renders unjust interlocutory order or decree;
    2. Renders a manifestly unjust interlocutory order or decree through inexcusable negligence or ignorance.

ISSUE:

        W/N Sandiganbayan committed error in denying the petition to quash and for not considering the findings of the special prosecutor.

        W/N petitioners were denied of due process of law.

        W/N petitioners were denied of equal protection of the law.

HELD:

        No.  While OCA perceived no evidence that the respondent judge issued the questioned order knowing it to be unjust; and neither is there any proof of conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice, it found Gabo liable for gross ignorance of the law in failing to conduct a summary proceeding to determine whether or not the evidence of guilty was strong, considering that the charge of murder is non-bailable.

        The Court ruled that the quantum of proof required to hold respondent judge guilty for alleged violations of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 and Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, is proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty.  Here, the allegations of the complaint-affidavit are unsubstantiated. Respondent judge cannot, of course, be pronounced guilty on the basis of bare allegations. There has to be evidence on which conviction can be anchored. The evidence must truly be beyond reasonable doubt.

        On the matter of gross ignorance of the law, records on hand decisively warrant a finding against the respondent. Respondent judge was acting upon a case of murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Murder being a capital offense, respondent judge should have been mindful that bail cannot be allowed as a matter of right.  The discretion of the court, in cases involving capital offenses may be exercised only after there has been a hearing called to ascertain the weight of the evidence against the accused.  The discretion lies in appreciating and evaluating the weight of the evidence of guilty against the accused.    Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law.

       Thus, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor , i.e. , that the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law, or misconduct, is obviously applicable in the instant case.

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