In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty
AM No. 10-10-4-SC
Leonardo-De Castro, J.:
FACTS:
On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice Mariano del Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the intent of the original works. The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006. Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.
On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37 faculty members. In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.”
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be promulgated. Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.
In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of words used were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating therein that their intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as “focusing on constructive action.” Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article. Furthermore, the respondents argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.
ISSUES:
W/N the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories in the questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar.
“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.
“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.”
“In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.”
The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”
DISSENTING OPINION
Sereno, J.:
The Court’s act in directing the law professors to furnish the Show Cause Resolution is like the little boy who exclaimed that the emperor has no clothes in the Danish story be made to explain why he should not be punished for his keen observation which is an act of prematurely judging them guilty. The Court’s act of labelling Justice del Castillo’s act as not plagiarism is what makes this contempt case grave. It should not be the place of the Court to seek revenge against those who have the courage to say what is wrong with it.
The Resolution requiring the Show Cause Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its own face, since this judicial act is the one that is totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance.
Carpio, J.:
The Show Cause Resolution by the respondents is sufficient and there is no need to admonish or warn them of the use of disrespectful language. The Court adheres to the clear and present danger test and it appears that the evil consequences of the statements are absent and it does not exhibit that irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their members. There is only contempt when the article is taken apart, contrary to the practice of the Court which is to read with contextual care making sure that disparaging statements are not taken out of context.
