GALLARDO v PEOPLE
GR No. 142030, 21 Apr 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.:
FACTS:
Sometime on Jan 1998, Mayor Arturo Gallardo, Vice Mayor Peter Melchor Arches, the SB Members and the Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional of the LGU of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, refused to perform their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for the unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits of the Public Health Workers.
On 27 Apr 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation. On 26 July 1999, Spec. Prosecutor Jose Montero, Jr recommended the dismissal of the case which was disapproved by Ombudsmand Aniano Desierto.
On 15 Nov 1999, petitioners filed a motion to quash the information due to following grounds:
Such petition was denied by the Sandiganbayan on 6 Jan 2000 stating that the averments in the information sufficiently charged the offense, and that the mere fact that cases similar to this case were dismissed by the Ombudsman does not mean due process or equal protection of the law clause was denied the petitioners.
Petitioners:
The investigation of Montero shows the insufficiency of funds as the reason for failure to appropriate and that they acted in good faith in said failure. This was not considered by the Sandiganbayan.
The one-sentence disapproval of Desierto was arbitrary due to want of explanation, hence depriving them of their rights to be informed of the facts and the law on which the denial based.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners committed the crime charged.
HELD:
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgment or final orders. A final order is one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. The resolution of the Sandiganbayan sought to be reviewed or set aside is not in any sense judgment or a final order, but an interlocutory order which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. The Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion to quash by the petitioners is interlocutory in nature because it leaves something more to be done by the Sandiganbayan, by way of resolving the case on the merits; it allows the same petitioners to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on their part to present the special defenses they invoked in their motion and if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom via appeal by certiorari.
No. The order of the Ombudsman for the filing of the necessary information is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. The state of affairs, however, is that the Ombudsman's note stems from his review of the findings of fact reached by the investigating prosecutor. The Ombudsman was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct an investigation anew. He is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not.
Courts should not interfere in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (GADALEJ) on the part of the Ombudsman which is absent in the case at hand.
In the same vein, Sandiganbayan could not be blamed for not considering the findings of the special prosecutor because the rule is that in case of conflict in the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the special prosecutor, it is the former's decision that shall prevail since the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of the Ombudsman. Moreover, once a case has been filed with the court, it is that court, no longer the prosecution, which has full control of the case, so much so that the information may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion
Public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. They merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.
No. The equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may be treated differently from another.
The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial.
